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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FLORENCE SCHWEITZER, 
Pla~ntvff and Re-spondent, 
-vs.-
HARVEY STONE, S & I TRUCK-
ING COMPANY, LLOYD V. HIG-
GENBOTI-IAM, and WE~S~TER.N 
.AUTO TRANSPORT COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and 
FRED SULLIVAN, 
Defendant, Cross-Complainant and 
Respondent, 
-vs.-
I\'" AN SHEFFY, 
[>t a.£nt£ff ~n I ntervent~on and 
Respondent. 
C.ase No. 921 
BRIEF OF LLOYD V. HIGGENBOTHAM AND 
vVESTERN AUTO TRANSPORT COMPANY, 
APPELLANTS 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
On April 20, 1957, at about 10:30 P.M., on Highway 
30, approximately 14 miles west of Castle Rock in Sum-
mit County, Utah, Harvey Stone, an employee of the 
S & I Trucking Company was driving said company's 
truck eastvvard vvithin the scope of his employment when 
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it ran out of fuel and stalled on an up-grade partially 
blocking the eastbound traffic lanes. In attempting to 
start the engine Harvey Stone was assisted by Ivan 
Sheffy, also an employee of S & I Trucking Company 
who had parked his truck further eastwa:vd and walked 
back to help Stone. While so parked, an eastbound 
Western Auto Transport truck driven by Lloyd V. 
Higgenbotham, an employee of said company, and while 
in the scop,e of his employment collided wrth the rear of 
the trailer of the S & I truck injuring the drivers of both 
vehicles, I van Sheffy and Fred Sullivan who was riding 
in the sleeper compartn1ent of the cab of the vV estern 
Auto Transport truck. Fred Sullivan owned the tractor, 
which was under lease to Western Auto Transport. His 
capacity .at the time of the accident was that of an 
employee of Western Auto Transport. 
T:he force of the collision caused one of the vehicles, 
a pick-up truck carried by the WesteTn Auto Transport 
vehicle, to break loose from the load and fall to the high-
way where it blocked the westbound traffic lane. Shortly 
after the collison betwe·en the two tru,cks .a passenge!r 
vehicle driven in a westerly direction by John Seh\veitzer, 
while attempting to avoid eolliding with the dislodged 
pick-up truck collided with the rear left portion of the 
S & I trailer at the lef·t front of the vVestern Auto Trans-
port tractor. Florence Schweitzer, a passenger in her 
husband's car, filed suit for personal injury damage 
against Harvey Stone, S & I Trucking Company, Lloyd 
Higgenbotham, Fred Sullivan and \V estern Auto Trans-
port Company. Ijloyd lfiggenhothain, vVestern Auto 
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Transport .and Fred Sullivan cross-complained against 
Harvey s~tone and S & I Trucking Company, who coun-
ter-cross-claimed. I van Sheffy filed a Complaint in inter-
vention against Lloyd Higgenbotham, Western Auto 
Transport and Fred Sullivan. 
On the trial of the case Western Auto Transport, 
Lloyd I-Iiggenbotham and Fred Sullivan settled the 
Florence Schweitzer claim before the case was submitted 
to the jury, \vhich returned a verdict of $23,000.00 against 
all defendants with the exception of Fred Sullivan, who 
\vas dismissed out of the case .a.s a party defendant as a 
1natter of law. The further sum of $4,500.00 was returned 
in favor of Ivan Sheffy on his ·Co1nplaint in interven~tion 
again Lloyd Higgenbotham and Western Auto Transport, 
and the sum of $8,000.00 in favor of Fred Sullivan on 
his Cross-Complaint against Harvey Stone and the S & I 
Trucking Company. 
This is an appeal by Lloyd Higgenbotham and 
'Vestern Auto Transport fro1n the judgment in favor of 
Iv.an Sheffy. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The collision between the s~talled S & I Truck and 
the ''T estern Auto Transport truck occurred at about 
10:30 p.1n., April 20, 1957, on an uphill grade about 14 
miles vvest of Castle Rock in Summit Colmty, Utah, on 
U. S. Highway 30. The highvvay at that point runs gen-
erally e.ast and west and is straight for ap·proximately 
eight-tenths of a mile west of the s-cene of the accident. 
The night "~as dark; it had rained earlier but at the 
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time of the accident the surface of the highway was dry. 
Beginning app·roximately 600 feet to the west .at the start 
of the grade, the highway was divided into two eastbound 
traffic lanes approximately 12 feet in width and one 
westerly traffic lane 19 feet in width. On the south side 
there was a distance of 2.3 feet between the eastbound 
outside lane and th.e edge of the hard surface. The 
shoulder on the south side was sloped downward while 
the edge of the hard surface on the north side was pro-
tected by guard rails. (Exhibit H 13). 
Before the aceident a tr.actor pulling a flatbed type 
trailer loaded with sacks of ''drill mud'' owned by the 
S & I Trucking ·Company, and driven by its employee 
Harvey Stone, 'vas p;roceeding easterly up-grade when 
the engine began to sputter and stopped. Mr. Stone was 
of the opinion that the main fuel tank was empty and 
attempted to switch connections to the auxiliary fuel tank 
without success, and the truck stopped in a diagonal 
position with the righit front wheels slightly off the hard 
surface and the rear of the loaded trailer extending 
about three feet over the dividing line into the inside 
eastbound lane. ( T. 138, 139, Exhibit 13). Mr. Stone 
remained in the cab attemp·ting to start the engine by 
operating the starter. 
Ivan Sheffy, also an S & I employee, testified he 
was driving a truck 1,000 to 1,500 feet to the rear of the 
Stone vehicle when he saw it begin to turn from the in-
side to the outside lane. (T. 292). ,~Vhen he passed Mr. 
Stone's truck it 'vas still moving. l\fr. Sheffy parked his 
trurk about 400 to 500 feet further east, ( T. 295) and 
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walked back to l\lr. Stone's 'truck where he stood on the 
left side of the highway surface with his head in the cab 
assisting Stone start the engine. Sheffy did not see the 
lights of the approaching Western Auto Transport truek. 
lie esti1nated he could see one-half mile of the highway 
to the west (T. 309), and he did not hear the sound of the 
approaching VV estern Auto Transport truck coming up-
grade. ( T. 315). He testified there was noise from the 
operation of the starter of the Stone truck (T. 318) which 
vvas operated intermittently and not continuously. (T. 
354). }u3 he was thus assisting Mr. Stone, Mr. Sheffy 
\Vas R\vare of the fact that the truck was not protected 
by flares (T. 310), and that the highway was heavily 
traveled. (T. 307). 
Lloyd Higgenbotham, an employee of Western Auto 
Transport vvas driving a truck loaded with auton1obiles 
and pick-up trucks, easterly. The tractor was leased to 
\Vestern Auto Transport by Fred Sullivan, also .an 
en1ployee of that comp·any and vvho was sleeping in the 
cab co1npartment when the accident hap·pened. 
As Lloyd Higgenhotha1n traveled easterly, he met 
t\vo \Ves'tbound trueks about tv1o or three n1iles west of 
the scene of the collision. He switched his lights from 
high be.an1 to lovv beam and the switch ren1ained in the 
lo\v beam position until the collision vvith the S & I truck 
occurred. As he approached the scene his truck was in 
the outside lane of traffic travelling 48 miles per hour. 
(T. 97) There vvere no lights on the stalled vehicle (T. 
99), and he did not become a \vare of its location on the 
high,vay until he \Vas approximately 70 feet avvay. On 
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first observation he couldn't determine what it was be-
cause the load blended into the color pattern of the high-
way. (T. 93). Mr. Higgenbotham attempted to turn the 
Western Auto Transport truck to the left but was unable 
to avoid colliding with the rear of the S & I load. (T. 
100). Before he and Sullivan could get flares out, the 
se:con,d collision involving Mr. Schweitzer occurred. 
On the third day of trial Western Auto Transport, 
Lloyd Higgenbotham and Fred Sullivan settled the clailn 
of Florence Schweitzer against 'them. At the conclusion 
of the evidence, the remaining issues between the parties 
were submitted to the jury on a "special verdict." The 
jury found unanimously that I-Iarvey Stone was negligent 
in failing to have lights on or flares about the S & I truck 
immediately before the collision and that such negligence 
was a proximate cause of the collision. (T. 92). 'The jury 
found unanimously that Ivan Sheffy was negligent in 
exposing himself to the hazard in assisting Harvey Stone 
to start ~the stalled truek when it was unlighted and not 
protected by flares, and also that Sheffy was negligent in 
failing to keep a proper lookout for his own safety, but 
that neither finding of negligence was a proximate eause 
of his injuries. ( T. 95). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT 
A VERDICT OF "NO CAUSE OF ACTION'' IN FAVOR OF 
'THESE APPELLANTS AND AGAINST INTERVENOR IV AN 
SHEFFY, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE GRANTING A NEW 
TRIAL, BECAUSE THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO INTERROGA-
TORIES WERE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL 
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VERDICT, AND THE COURT WAS REQUIRED TO FIND AS 
A MATTER OF LAW THAT INTERVENOR SHEFFY'S NEG-
LIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY 
AND DAMAGE. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN FAILING 'TO RECEIVE IN EVIDENCE CERTAIN PROF-
FERED WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RECORDS OF THE 
STATE OF WYOMING. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT 
A VERDICT OF "NO CAUSE OF ACTION" IN FAVOR OF 
THESE APPELLANTS AND AGAINST INTERVENOR IV AN 
SHEFFY, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE GRANTING A NEW 
TRIAL, BECAUSE THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO INTERROGA-
TORIES WERE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL 
VERDICT, AND THE COURT WAS REQUIRED TO FIND AS 
A l\1ATTER OF LAW THAT INTERVENOR SHEFFY'S NEG-
LIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY 
AND DAMAGE. 
At the conclusion of the evidenee the -court instructed 
the jury generally on the issues raised in the case. Also, 
pursuant to Rule 49, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
court submitted to the jury a series of interrogatories in 
\\Thich it 'v.as directed to make specific findings. The 
pertinent portion of those questions submitted and the 
ans\\Ters made by the jury are as follovvs: 
"QUESTION I 
(A) 'Vas Harvey Stone negligent by allovving the 
gasoline of one tank to become exhausted 
before svvitching to the auxiliary gasoline 
tank~ 
Ans,ver: Yes 
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If so, was such negligence a p,roximate cause 
of the collision, 
(a) Between the two trucks involved? 
Answer: Yes 
(b) Between the Schweitzer car and 
two trucks involved? 
Answer: Yes 
(B) Was Harvey 'Stone negligent in failing to 
remove the S & I truck from the travelled 
portion of the highway~ 
Answer: N,o 
If so, was such negligenee a proximate cause 
of the collision, 
(a) Between the two trucks involved? 
Answer: No 
(b) Between the Schweitzer car and 
the two trucks involved? 
Answer: No 
(C) Was Harvey Stone negligent in failing to 
have lj~ghts on or flares about the S & I 
truck immediately prior to the collision be-
tween the two trucks? 
Answer: Yes 
If so, was such negligence a p~roximate cause 
of the collision, 
(a) Between the. two trucks involved? 
Answer: Yes 
(b) Between the Schweitzer car and 
the two trucks involved~ 
Answer: Yes'' 
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''QUESTION III 
(A) D'id Ivan Sheffy negligently expose himself 
to a hazard which he knevv or in the exercise 
of a reasonable care should have known 
might result in harm to him by assisting 
H.arvey Stone to start the stopped truck 
when there were no lights on sai~d truck with. 
out first putting flares out to warn other 
motorists of the presence of said truck? 
Answer: Yes 
If so, was such negligence a proximate cause 
of the injuries which Ivan Sheffy received? 
Answer: No 
(B) Did Ivan Sheffy fail to keep such a lookout 
for his own safety -vvhile he was assisting 
Harvey Stone as would have been kept by a 
reasonably prudent person under the same 
circumstances? 
Answer: Yes 
If so, was such failure a proximate, cause of 
the injuries to Ivan Sheffy? 
Answer: No'' (R. 90) 
After ans\vering the questions indica ted, the jury 
returned a general verdict of $4,500.00 as damages sus-
tained by Ivan Sheffy, (R. 97) and against Lloyd V. 
Higgenbotham and Western Auto Transport Company. 
(R. 106). These appellants took proper and timely ex-
ception to the court's ruling .and filed a n1otion for a 
directed verdict and motion for a new trial. (R. 190 to 
201). 
Rule 49 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
as follovvs : 
''. . . vVhen the general verdict and the ans-
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wers are harmonious, the court shall direct the 
entry of the appropriate judgment upon the ver-
dict and answers. When the answers are consist-
ent with each other, but one or more is incon-
sistent with the general verdict, the court may 
direct the entry of judgment in accordance with 
the answers, nO'twithstanding the general verdict 
or may return the jury for further consideration 
of its answers and verdict or may order a nevv 
trial. When the answers are in-consistent with 
each other and one or more is likewise inconsist-
ent with the general verdict, the court shall not 
direet the entry ·of judgment but may return the 
jury for further consideration of its answers and 
verdict or may order a new trial.'' 
As noted above, Mr. Harvey Stone was found negli-
gent in two particulars, both of which were found by the 
jury to be the p·roximate cause of the collision between 
the two trucks and the Schweitzer automobile. He was 
found negligent in allowing ''the gasoline of one tank to 
be-come exhausted before switching to the auxiliary gaso-
line tank,'' and ''in failing to have lights ·on or flares 
about the S & I truck immediately prior to the collision 
between the two trucks.'' Mr. I van Sheffy was found 
negligent in exposing ''himself to a hazard which he 
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have 
known, might result in harm to him by assisting Harvey 
Stone to start the stopp·ed truck when there were no 
lights on sa~d truck without f~rst putttng flares out to 
wa.rn other 1notorists of the presence of said truck," and 
also of failing ''to keep such lookout for his own safety 
while he was assitsing Harvey Stone as "\Yould have been 
kept by a reasonably prudent person under the same 
10 
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eirctunstance~." The jury found that neither of these 
findings of negligence as pertained to Mr. Sheffy vvere 
the proximate cause of his injuries. These findings are 
inconsistent. 
lVIr. Sheffy's conduct at the time he returned to as-
sist Mr. Ston·e is stated as follows: (R. 264) 
"Q. Now, what did you do after you back to 
the truck, Mr. Stone's truck~ 
A. After I rea'ched Mr. Stone's truck, he opened 
the door and I asked him wha:t was wrong, 
and-
* * * 
A. And he was trying to start his truck. 
Q. His engine was dead, was it~ 
A. His engine was dead. That's right. 
Q. And what was he doing in trying to start it~ 
A. He had-what was he doing~ 
Q. Yes. 
A. Well, he w.as turning it ·over. 
Q. With the starter~ 
A. With the starter. That's right, sir. 
Q. What did you do~ 
A. And I asked him if he was out of gas. And 
he said: 'I don't know, it just stopped.' 
And I figured he must be ; and when he said 
that, I turned-they have a lit·tle valve right 
on the left of the driver, and if you do run 
out of g.as, you can switch to another tank 
by turnng the valve, and so I did that, and 
I told him: 'Do you have the electric fuel 
pump on~' ..._L\.nd he said: 'Yes', and at that 
same time he vvas trying to start it.'' 
11 
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Mr. Sheffy observed that he could see one-half mile 
to the rear of the Stone vehicle. ( T. 266). While assist-
ing Mr. Stone, he ''leaned in ·the eab on the left side while 
his feet remained on the ground." ( T. 266). He stated 
further " ... I 'vas looking inside helping Mr. Stone try-
ing to get his vehicle started." ( T. 266, 267). While thus 
assisting Mr. Stone, he saw no lights or heard no noise 
from an approaching truck or other automobiles. The 
force of ·the impact with the Western Auto Transport 
truck ''knocked (Mr. Sheffy) behind the duel wheels of 
the tractor''. He didn't observe the direction or source 
of the eollision. 
Mr. Sheffy and Mr. Stone were engaged in doing 
the same act-at the same place-at the same time. Since 
the jury determined that the act of attempting to start 
the truck in the dark of night "\Vithout the benefit of clear-
ance lights or flares to protect themselves or approaching 
traffic constituted negligence, \Vhich was the proxi1nate 
cause of the resulting collisions, it is impossible to recon-
cile this finding with their finding t,hat the same negli-
genee was not a proximate cause of 1\fr. Sheffy's injury. 
In .addition, ~1r. Sheffy was found to have been negligent 
in failing to n1antain a proper lookout for his o'vn safety 
under the circumstances. This finding seems obvious 
since he testified that he could see one-half nlile to the 
rear of the Stone vehicle, but yet failed to see the ap-
proaching lights of the Western Auto Transport truck. 
It was .a cool .dark night in April and even though the 
approaching Western Auto Transport truck "_,_as pulling 
a heavy load up-grade, Mr. Sheffy failed to hear it as it 
12 
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approached. The negligence in e.ach partieular was con-
tinuing in nature. 
There is no reasonable basis for distinguishing be-
tween the acts of Mr. Stone and Mr. Sh·effy. Each had 
been found negligent on an additional ground; ~1r. Stone 
in permitting his truck to run out of gas, .and Mr. Sheffy 
in failing to maintain a reasonable p·rudent lookout for 
his own safety. Such is of no comfort or assistance to 
Mr. Sheffy, however, beeause both Mr. Stone and Mr. 
Sheffy were found guilty of a common act of negligence 
"\vhich under the circumstances of this case cannot be the 
proximate cause as to one and not the proximate cause 
as to the other. As a matter of fa;ct, Mr. Sheffy 's estab-
lished negligence of failing to maintain .a reasonable 
lookout for his own safety was continuing and concurrent 
"\vith his negligent act of attempting to start the truck 
under the circumstances indicated. 
There is no evidence of an independent intervening 
cause vvhich is sufficient to insulate Mr. Sheffy's estab-
lished negligence as a p-roximate cause. Farrell vs. Cam-
eron, 98 Ut. 68,94 P. 2d 1068, (1939). The chain of events 
\vhich vvere set in motion by the eombined and concur-
rent negligence of Mr. Sheffy and Mr. Stone were con-
tinuing and under the facts of this case, causation cannot 
legally be separated between them. 
Since the jury had deterrnined Mr .S:heffy's negli-
gence, the court should have found proximate cause 
under the circumstances as a matter of law because the 
'' ... evidentiary facts are of such conclusive character 
13 
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as to require all reasonable minds to eonclude that the 
ultimate fact ... of p~roximate cause ... '' existed as a 
result of his conduct. Gibbs v. Blue Cab, 122 Ut. 312 
249 p. 2d 213, 215 ( 1952). 
This ease is similar to the case of Remy v. Exley 
Produce Express, 307 P. 2d 65, (Calif. 1957). Plaintiff 
Remy brought an action to recover for damages arising 
out of a collision between his truck with defendant's ap-
proaching truck which had crossed the center line at 
approximately the same location where co-defendant B 
and B Auto Sales automobile had been left stuck in a 
snow bank on the defendant's side of the highway. De-
fendant Exley Produce Express filed a cross complaint 
against the plaintiff, Remy and co-defendant B and B 
Auto Sales. In the main action the plaintiff was given 
judgment against both defendants Exley Produce Ex-
press and B and B Auto Sales. On the cross complaint 
Exley \Vas given judgment against B and B Auto Sales. 
The court observed at page 67: 
' '·This, then, brings us to the question of 
whether the verdicts and judgment were incon-
sistent, one with the other. Plaintiff's verdict and 
judgment were against both the parked cars (B & 
B Auto Sales) and the Exley truck. Thus, there 
was an i1nplied finding that both were negligent, 
but the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the 
Exley truck and against a parked c.ar (B & B 
Auto Sales) thereby impliedly finding that while 
the Exley trtlck, \vhose damage was due to its 
collision with plaintiff's truck, was negligent as 
against plaintiff's truck, it 'Yas not negligent as 
against the p·arked cars. Put another way, the 
jury impliedly found that \vhen the Exley truck 
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collided with plaintiff's truck the cause, so far 
as the injury to plaintiff's truck was concerned, 
'vas the joint negligence of the parked cars e.nd 
the Exley truck, and yet the damage to the Exley 
truck in that same collision, was solely caused by 
the negligenee of the parked cars. 
* * * 
'' ... It is elear that the two verdicts and judg-
Inent, finding as they impliedly do, that Exley in 
one act was 'negligent and not negligent' are in-
consistent, and that the judgment appealed fron1 
cannot stand.'' 
While the cited case deals in terms of negligence it 
is submitted that under the circumstances of the p·resent 
case, the established negligent conduct of Mr. Sheffy and 
1\Ir. Stone cannot .at the same time be the proximate cause 
as to one but not of the other. 
Again in the case of Detrixhe v. klcQuigg, 316 P. 2d 
617, (Okla. 1957), a problem of inconsistent verdicts "\vas 
considered. In that case Dick C. Detrixhe was operating 
a pick-up truck belonging to Edward P. Detrixhe & Sons, 
a partnership, of which he was a member, in an easterly 
direction along a county road. George L. Dietrixhe, who 
\vas not a 1nember ·of the partnership, was a passenger 
in the pick-up. As the vehicle approached the summit of 
a s1nall hill, .an automobile o-wned and driven by Joseph 
:JicQuigg can1e over the hill proceeding west,vard. The 
two vehicles collided in the center of the road. All the 
named individuals 'vere injured and the vehicles dam-
aged .. There "\Vere three actions initiated: 
1. By Dick C. Detrixhe, against ~IcQuigg, to re-
cover for his personal injuries. In this c.ase ~feQuigg 
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cross petitioned against Detrixhe for his personal In-
juries and damage to his car. 
2. By George Detrixhe against McQuigg; and 
3. Edward P. Detrixhe & Sons, a partnership, 
against McQuigg. 
By stipulation the three cases were consolidated and 
tried by the same jury, although separate instructions 
were given in each action. 
In the first action, Dick C. Detrixhe was granted a 
recovery. On defendant's eross claim the jury found for 
defendant McQuigg. 
In the second action, the jury found against MeQuigg 
and in favor of George Detrixhe, and 
In the third case, the jury found against J\fcQuigg 
.and in favor of Detrixhe & Sons, a partnership. 
The court accepted the last t,vo verdicts and re-
submitted the first after further instructions, ··whereupon 
the jury returned the following verdict: 
We, the jury *** find for the defendant J os-
eph H. McQuigg on his cross petition, and against 
p·laintiff Dick C. Detrixhe ... '' 
It is immediately observed that the jury found 
McQuigg negligent in t\vo actions and not negligent in 
another, and likewise found Diek Detrixhe free from 
contributory negligence in two .actions, but negligent in 
his ovvn. The court found that the verdicts were incon-
sistent and granted a new trial. 
See also the case of Stat.z v. Pohl, 63 NW 2d 556, 
(Wise.), where a jury in an auto1nobile collision case 
found the driver negligent as to control, but determined 
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that such negligence \vas not a proximate cause of the 
accident. In an answer to a question inquiring as to 
comparative negligence, the jury found that the driver's 
negligence ·contributed to cause the accident to the extent 
of 20 percent. The verdict was inconsistent and a new 
trial was granted. 
Where proximate cause is clear it becomes the duty 
of the trial court to direct a verdict. Here the question 
was considerably simplified inasmuch as the negligence 
of l\Ir. Sheffy was established as \Vas the negligence of 
~lr. Stone. It is submitted that under the facts of this 
case, the continuing established negligence of Mr. She.ffy 
superimposed upon his further negligence of failing to 
1naintain a reasonable lookout for his own safety, was a 
proxi1nate ·cause of his injury which was sufficient to 
bar his recovery of any damages for injuries received. 
The trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict in 
favor of these appellants and against Mr. Sheffy on the 
issue of proximate cause, and in failing to grant a new 
trial because the jury's answers to interrogatories \vere 
inconsistent \vith the general verdict. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COlVIMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN FAILING 'TO· RECEIVE IN EVIDENCE CERTAIN PROF-
FERED WORKMEN'S COl\1PENSATION RECORDS OF THE 
STATE OF WYOMING. 
During the course of the trial, the attorney for 
\Y.estern Auto Transp·ort .and its drivers Lloyd Higgen-
botham and Fred Sullivan, tendered in evidence a medi-
cal report prepared by Dr. Knapp, which had been p·re-
pared for and filed \vith the Department of Workmen's 
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Compensation of the State of \¥yoming. (Ex. H 30). 
The report revealed the results of a medical examination 
made by Dr. Robert D. Knap·p concerning the physical 
condition of Mr. Ivan Sheffy between April 26th and 
August 10, 1957. The reports indicate~d that 1\{r. Sheffy's 
injuries were of a temporary nature and that he did not 
sustain permanent disability as a result of the accident. 
Further, a report of Dr. Robert K. Knapp bearing date 
December 7, 1958, was read in evidence in which he stated 
that Mr. Sheffy had suffered a permanent physical dis-
ability as a result of the accident. (T. 287). Also, ~1r. 
Sheffy testified to a conversation with Dr. Knapp in 
which the doctor allegedly told him that he had a ''per-
manent injury". (T. 313). The proposed exhibit \vas 
offered for two purposes: (1) As evidence of the 
physical condition of Ivan Sheffy as reported by Dr. 
Knap·p to the Worlanen's ·Compensation Department of 
Wyoming, and (2) For the purpose of impeaching the 
testimony of Ivan Sheffy relative to his mentioned con-
versation with Dr. Knapp and to impeach the report of 
Dr. Knapp which was read in evidence. The two reports 
were inconsistent. The fact that Dr. Knapp was not 
present in eourt to personally testify does not make his 
Workman's Compensation report objectionable since his 
report of Decen1ber 7, 1958, was read with the san1e effect 
as though he were present, and his testimony in thus 
subject to i1npeachment. 
Each docun1ent offered in evidence \\'"as certified .as 
follows: 
''I do hereb~T certify this docun1ent to be an 
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authentic copy of like document in the official fileR 
of this Department. 
State of Wyoming 
C. J. 'Doc' Rogers 
State Treasurer & Fund Trustee 
By Wm. P. Petry 
Director of Workmen's Com-
pensation 
(Seal) 
Workmen's Compensation Dept. 
Wyoming. 
(Seal)" 
The inforrnation contained in the report had direct 
bearing upon the issues before the eourt and the jury; 
namely, the physical condition of intervenor Ivan Sheffy 
and the truthfulness of his statements relative to his con-
versation vvith Dr. Knapp. Certainly the documents were 
material .and relevant. Under the provisions of Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the compens!ation records were 
properly authenticated and were admissible in evidence 
for the purposes indicated. 
Article IV, Sec. 1 of the Constitution of he United 
States requires that : 
"Full faith and credit shall be given to each 
state to the public .acts, records, and judieial pro-
ceedings of every other state ... '' 
Pursuant to further provisions of this section, the 
United States ·Congress passed certain statutes establish-
ing maximum standards of authentication of documents, 
and if those standards are met, one state is bound to 
accept in evidence the authenticated document of the 
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other. (828 U.S:C.A., Sec. 1738, 1739). The standards of 
authentication so established were not intended to pre-
empt this area of state relationships, and does not pre-
clude (\ne state from requiring less proof of authenticity 
of reeo~ds or copies of a sister state than is prescribed 
by the Federal Statutes indicated. As was observed in 
the case of Willock v. Wilson, (178 Mass. 68, 59 N.E. 757), 
"Neither the Federal Constitution nor the 
statutes forbids. the state from authorizing the 
proof of records in other ways than in their own 
state courts ; provided, always, of course, that the 
state statutes, if put in force, shall not have t:he 
effect of excluding a record authenticated accord-
ing to the requirements of the Federal Statute. 
Thus, if the authentication satisfied the local 
statute, it need not be conformed to the require-
ments of the Act of Congress.'' 
See also Black v. Schafer, 62 Okla. 114, 162 P. 456 (1917). 
Other eases are cited in 5 L.R.A. (New Series) 940. 
The legislature has defined the standard of proof of 
authentication of the "official records" necessary to 
make the records or documents of sister states adnlissible 
in Utah. Rule 44(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in-
sofar as the same is pertinent here provides: 
"An official record or en try therein, \vhen 
.admissible for any purpose, 1nay be evidenced by 
an official publication having the legal publication 
thereof or by a eopy attested by the officer having 
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, 
and in the absence of judicial knowledge of com-
petent evidence, .accompanied "\Yith a certificate 
that such officer has the custody ... " 
Further light is cast upon this problen1 by Rule 44 
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(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides as 
follows: 
''As used in this Rule 'official record' shall 
mean all public \Vritings, including laws, judicial 
records, all official~documents, and public records 
of private writings.'' 
Since Rule 44(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
defines ''official record'' within the framework of Rule 
44( a), it would appear to he the intention of the legisla-
ture to give definite meaning to ''official records,., as 
referred to in the rule. The statute, in defining ''official 
records,'' includes not only those documents ordinarily 
considered to be official but includes all "official docu-
ments and p~tblic records of private wr~tings." 
Under the p·rovisions of the Wyoming law, compensa-
tion clain1s are filed with and under the supervision of the 
District Court of the county where the injury occurred. 
(Wyoming Statutes, Sec. 27-113). Section 27-118 of the 
Wyoming Statutes is significant: 
"Every award within the meaning of this 
Act is a judicial determination of the rights of the 
employer, the e1nployee, and the Industrial Acci-
dent Fund.'' 
The Director of Workmen's Compensation is a public 
orfice created within the office of the State Treasurer 
of the State of Wyoming. (Wyo. Statutes 9-82). The 
recor-ds of that office are similarly public in nature. Dr. 
I\:napp's medical report which w.as prepared under direc-
tion of the Director of vVorkmen's Compensation, al-
though prepared by a private physician, became a public 
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document by reason of its inclusion in the files of the 
Director of vVorkmen 's ·Compensation, and as such comes 
within the purview of Rule 44 (a) and (e). 
In reviewing Rule 44(a), it is to be observed that the 
certification of the foreign document is to be made by 
the person having "legal custody of the record.'' The 
rule states that ''. . . in the absence of judicial knowl-
edge or eompetent evi,dence,'' the record is to be a;ccom-
panied with a certificate that such officer has the custody. 
A review of the certification appearing on the Workmen's 
Compensation Reports will indicate that each document 
w.as certified to and signed by Mr. William P. Petry, 
Director of Workmen's Compensation. His signature 
is then accompanied by the seal of the Department on 
which is inscribed ''Workmen's Compensation Depart-
ment Seal, Wyoming.'' 
It is submitted that the court should have taken judi-
cial knowledge of the fact that the Director of Workmen's 
Compensation has custody of the records within his de-
partment. 
Under the p~rovisions of 78-25-1, Utah Code Anno-
tated ( 1953), certain facts are identified of \vhich the 
courts in Utah take judicial notiee; however, facts other 
than those statutorily identified are also "~thin the .ambit 
of such judicial kno,,r ledge. In this connection, the Su-
preme Court has stated in the case of Stale v. La1rrence, 
120 Utah 323, 234 P. 2d 600, (1951), 
''Beyond the scope of the statute providing 
that certain matters \Yill be taken judicial notice 
of, there is another elass of facts which are so 
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well known and accepted that they are judicially 
noticed without taking the time, trouble and ex-
pense necessary to prove the1n. Under this doc-
trine the court will consider, "\vithout proof of such 
gener.ally known facts, its knowledge of what is 
known to all persons of ordinary intelligence. * * * 
'"rhis court has recognized that class of judicial 
notice in a great variety of matters ... '' 
It is submitted that the fact that the Director of 
vVorkmen 's Compensation h.as the legal custody of the 
records of his department is a matter so generally known 
to all persons that the trial court should have taken 
judicial notice of the same. 
The lavvs of a sister state .are said to be presumed 
to be the same as the laws of Utah, in the absence of proof 
to the contrary. Wh~tmore Oxygen Company v. Utah 
State Tax Comm~ss~on, 114 Utah 1, 19·6 P. 2d 976. And 
even though such presumption is made in the instant ease, 
the result is the same because it is a matter of statute and 
COffilllOn knovvledge that the Director of vV orklnen 's Coln-
pensation in Utah has custody of the records of his de-
parbnent 35-1-1- et seq., U. C.A. ( 1953). 
Aside fro1n the plain language contained In Rule 
-±-± (e) U.R. C.P. relative to ''official documents,'' decided 
cases have admitted similar reports in evidence for simi-
lar purposes. 
In the case of Hardison Seed Company v. Jones, 149 
F. 2d 252, (Sixth Cir.1945), the 'Var Food Administrator 
sought and obtained .a cease and desist order against 
the defendant seed company for imp·roperly labeling its 
seeds which "\vere being distributd in interstate commerce. 
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A review of that order was sought claiming lack of evi-
dence to prove imp-roper labeling. Evidence indicated 
that samples of the seeds shipped by the defendant were 
taken by a representative of the State of Alabama and 
also by a Federal representative. Analyses were made by 
each of those individuals, but they vvere not called as wit-
nesses at the trial; however, a report was prepared by 
each .analyst which was received in evidence. The claim 
was m·ade that such evidence was incomp-etent, being 
hearsay, that its admission deprived the defendant of the 
right to cross exan1ine the seed analyst, and .an enforce-
ment of the order of the food administrator would de-
prive the defendant of due process of law. In this con-
nection the court stated: 
''Reports which are of a public nature and 
taken under .a competent authority to ascertain 
a matter of public interest are admissible in evi-
dence against the vvhole world. It is not essential 
to the admission of evidence of this nature that the 
inquiry should have been made by virtue of some 
judicial authority .and by means of ''itnesses ex-
amined upon oath. It is suffieient if it was made 
by virtue of competent authority on behalf of the 
public and on a subject matter of publie interest. 
(\Vigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, \ 1 ol. 5, 
Sec. 1670) 
* * * 
''. . . The records in question were of .a pub-
lic character, n1ade and kept for a public pur-
pose, and they c.on1e \vithin the rule \vhich admits 
in evidence records kept by persons in public of-
fice in vvhieh they are required, by the nature 
of their offiee, to \\Trite do\vn particular transac-
tons oeenrring in the eourse of their publir duties 
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or lmder their personal supervision. (Evanston 
v. Gunn, 99 U.S. 660, 666, 25 Law. Ed. 306.) The 
evdence was admissible; its weight was for the 
administrator.'' 
Siinilarly, in the case of JYI or an v. Pittsburgh-Des 
IJ!oimes Steel Company, 183 F. 2d 467 (Third Cir. 1950), 
a similar result was achived. In that instance recovery 
was sought from a defendant company for damages in-
curred through the eruption of a steel tank. A claim was 
made that the defendant 'vas negligent in manufacturing 
the tank in the shape of a cylinder rather than in the 
shape of a sphere. The plaintiff offered in evidence a 
report by the Bureau of l\{ines, U.S. Department of In-
terior, 'vhich tended to substantiate this elaim. The re-
port was received in evidence, even though conclusionary 
in nature. 
The C·ircuit Court, in finding that the report w.as ad-
missible without the necessity of calling the five indi-
viduals who prep·ared it, stated: 
''The report is no less admissible because it 
contains conclusions of experts which are based 
upon hearsay evidence as well as upon observa-
tion. These circumstances, by virtue of expressed 
statutory provision, go to the weight rather than 
to ad1nissibility. Moreover, this court has several 
times held that hospital reeords are admissible 
under the statute, and certainly medical diagnosis 
is no less .a matter of opinion based upon observa-
tion and perhaps hearsay than this report of the 
Bureau's investigation.'' (Citing cases.) 
See also the case of United States v. lVare, 247 F. 2d 
G98 (Seventh Cir. 1957), "\vhere an exhibit prepared by 
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Federal nareotic agents and chemist was found ad-
missible. 
''We think that there can be no doubt that the 
exhibits or memoranda made by the chemist were 
admissible as having been made in the regular 
course of business and that it was the regular 
course of business to make such memoranda or 
record of the findings of the chemist's analyses 
of the substances purchased from the defendant.'' 
The case was reversed on other grounds. 
The Circuit Court in the case of Olender v. United 
States, 210 F. 2d 795 (Ninth Cir. 1954), denied in evideooe 
the report of a welfare care worker, because it was hear-
say. In order to come within the official documents 
exception to the hearsay rule the court said that: 
''. . . the facts stated in the documents must 
have been \vithin the personal knowledge and ob-
servation of the recording official or his sub-
ordt"'nates, and that reports based upon general 
investigations and upon information gleaned 
secondhand from random sources must be ex-
cluded.'' 
Of course, the Circuit Court did not have the benefit 
of a statutory definition of "official docmnents" as is 
provided by Utah Rule 44( e) U.R.C.P., diseussed above. 
It is further submitted that a doctor \vho makes a report 
to the Director of W orlnnen 's Compensation, as was done 
in the instant case, is acting under the supervision of the 
Direetor and is a subordinate for that purpose. The Dir-
ector is the only one w·ho could properly certify to the 
authenticity of the doeuments tendered in evidence. 
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At the time the question documents were offered in 
evidence, they were offered not only for the purpose of 
..;howing the physical condition of ~fr. Sheffy, but also 
for the purpose of in1peac;hing the testimony of Mr. 
Sheffy and his doctor. The courts have held that while 
documents may not be admissible for one purpose, they 
n1ay be for another. This principal of evidence was 
clearly de1nonstrated in the case of Brown and Root v. 
Haddad, 180 S.W. 2d 339 (Texas, 1944). There an offi-
cial report as to the cause of an .accident was admitted 
in evidence for the purpose of impeaching the testimony 
of the person making the report. An action had been 
filed by the plaintiff for "\vrongful death. At the time the 
Highvvay Patrolman made his report, he stated th.at the 
defendant's truck driver had informed him that he was 
blinded by bright lights and unable to see the decedent 
pedestrian in time to avoid the collision. The report con-
flicted "\Vi th his direct testimony at the trial where he 
stated that a n1uddy windshield prevented the defendant 
from observing the decedent. 
The court stated that vvhile the patrolman's report, 
as sueh, \vas a hearsay statement and should have under 
the circun1stances of the case been excluded at the trial, 
if objected to on that ground, that sueh parts of his re-
port as may tend to impeach any direct evidence was 
admissible. To the san1e effect, see Fttiesen v. Schmelzel, 
318 P. 2d 368 CV{yo. 1957). 
In addition to the authenticated Workmen's Com-
pensation Reports being admissible to show nir. Sheffy's 
physical condition, they were adn1issible for purposes 
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of imp.eachment, and even though it were determined by 
this court that they were not admissible for the first pur-
pose for which they were proffered, they were clearly 
admissible for the second. 
CONCLUSION 
The records of the Department of Workmen's Com-
pensation of the State of Wyoming were "offieial rec-
ords'' authenticated in accordance with the intent and 
meaning of Rule 44, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
trial court corrrrnitted reversible error in failing to receive 
them as Exhibit H 30 for the purposes offered. First, 
to show the physical condition of Mr. S~heffy on the dates 
of the examinations made by Dr. Knapp as revealed in 
the reports; and Second, for the purpose of impeaching 
the testimony of Mr. Sheffy and a subsequent medical 
opinion prepared by Dr. Knapp. 
The trial court erred in failing to find as a matter 
of law that Mr. Sheffy''s negligence proximately caused 
his injuries. Further, reversible error was comnritted in 
failing to grant a ne\v trial to these ap·pellants because of 
the jury's inconsistent findings. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that this court should direct such a verdict, or in 
the alternative, grant a new trial. 
Resp·ectfully sub1nitted, 
HANSON, B1~DWIN & ALLEN 
& ~.fER LIN R. L YBBER.T 
Attorneys for Defenda.nts and 
Appellants 
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